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During his lifetime, Christopher W. Brooks (1948–2014) established himself as the 
foremost historian of law in early modern English society. He was the leading 
exponent of a history of early modern England that transcended the boundaries of 
social, political and legal history, and which placed law and lawyers centre stage. 
This chapter brings a critical, but friendly, eye to Brooks’s work, focusing on how 
Brooks created a distinctive vision of law in history, and on the strengths and 
weaknesses of that vision. I examine the influences that shaped his work (including 
Lawrence Stone, Wilfrid Prest, Sir John Baker, E.P. Thompson, Jürgen Habermas and 
Robert W. Gordon), locating his scholarship within several contemporary contexts, 
including social, intellectual and legal history, and socio-legal and critical legal 
studies. I then critically assess the claims, topics, factors, methods and theories that 
Brooks emphasised. I argue, for example, that Brooks’s tended to de-emphasise the 
relationship between law, power, domination, exclusion, structure, totality and 
society, and the way in which the legal system can be routinely manipulated to serve 
those privileged by property and position, problematizing the nature and extent of 
popular belief in the rule of law; and that this reflected and was sustained by his 
limited engagement with the new histories of crime, punishment and policing. I also 
argue that Brooks exaggerated the range and depth of law-consciousness and law’s 
legitimacy, and marginalized ‘alternative’ discourses. I suggest that until we know 
how individuals such as defendants judged their engagement with the law, claims 
about law-mindedness and legitimacy are best kept modest and circumspect; and 
that there is a need for greater discussion of the complex and diverse definitions of 
law-mindedness, law-consciousness, legitimacy, constitutive ideology, negotiation 
and other key concepts explicitly and implicitly employed in such research, and the 
possible locations of their empirical referents. I also problematize Brooks’s thesis that 
legal culture was less important after c.1700 than in the period c. 1560–1700. 




conclude that Brooks’s achievement was to systematically integrate law, politics and 
society, and legal, social and political history, and to demonstrate the considerable 
increase in historical knowledge that is likely to ensue from this fusion. He 
demonstrated that law and lawyers warranted at least the same attention as that 
traditionally lavished on religion and clerics. This essay builds on and extends my 
article, “Promoting Dialogue Between History and Socio-legal Studies: The 
Contribution of Christopher W. Brooks and the ‘Legal Turn’ in Early Modern 
English History,” (2017) 44 Journal of Law and Society issue S1, pp. S37- S60. 
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Law, Law-Consciousness and Lawyers as Constitutive of Early Modern England: 
Christopher W. Brooks’s Singular Journey 
 
 
[32] During the last half-century, Christopher W. Brooks (1948–2014) established 
himself as the foremost historian of law in early modern English society. Through 
his scholarship, his teaching and the generations of students he advised and 
supervised, and as a friend and colleague, Brooks exercised, from the early 1990s 
onwards, an increasingly significant influence on writing about early modern 
English history. He was the leading exponent of a history of early modern England 
that transcended the boundaries of social, political and legal history, and which 
placed law and lawyers centre stage. In doing so, he challenged major premises of 
the dominant vision of law-in-history in writing about English history. This chapter 
brings a critical, if friendly, eye to Brooks’s work, focusing on how Brooks beat his 
own path through the methodological thickets to create a distinctive vision of law in 
history, and on the strengths and weaknesses of that vision. 
 
From Princeton to Pettyfoggers (1967–1986) 
 
Born in Maryland, Brooks grew up in 1950s and 1960s America during the 
advancement of civil rights.1 This ‘rights revolution’ owed much to the 
democratization of access to the courts, the vitality of the support systems for rights 
litigation, liberal judicial activism and the large numbers of lawyers scrambling for 
business.2 The centrality of law and lawyers in American society had long been 
noted. Tocqueville famously observed that ‘[t]here is almost no political question in 
the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question’.3 
Indeed, Americans appeared to be quite conscious of their rights, and many viewed 
going to court as a respectable and viable way of engaging in disputes.4 Brooks 
brought this awareness of the centrality of law and lawyers in society and the 
popular imagination to bear on the history of early modern England. 
 
As an undergraduate at Princeton, Brooks was inspired by Lawrence Stone, who 
remained a key influence throughout his life. It was Stone who first taught Brooks 
the value of adopting the longue durée in social and cultural history; that historians 
can be both expansive and focused; that they should address big questions, postulate 
bold ideas and strive to address the diverse facets of society – intellectual, economic, 
moral, cultural and social – as a totality; that they should be prepared to inform their 
work with concepts derived from other disciplines; that they should open up fresh 
territories and new bodies of evidence; and that history should be interesting and 
exciting.5 That Brooks identified himself, first and foremost, as a social historian of 
early modern England and made social history his vocation was probably in no 





Following Princeton, Brooks began postgraduate study at Johns Hopkins,6 where 
several historians were undertaking pioneering work on the history of the 
professions – notably, law – which transcended the confines of institutional history, 
combining quantitative and qualitative analyses to produce histories that were both 
institutional and social.7 
 
In his first PhD supervisor, Wilfrid Prest, Brooks found a lifelong mentor, [33]  
friend and interlocutor. Prest’s research on barristers was a vital role model.8 It 
suggested that barristers and their institutional home, the Inns of Court, were more 
important than historians had often assumed. Prest argued that the history of the 
Inns of Court (and, by implication, lawyers) needed to be saved from ‘the domain of 
antiquaries and domestic chroniclers’.9 Rather than treating lawyers and the Inns of 
Court as ‘isolated from society at large’, Prest placed them ‘. . . firmly in their 
historical context, based on a thorough examination of the surviving evidence’, over 
a sufficiently lengthy period of time so as to challenge the conventional wisdom that 
the history of the Inns (and, by implication, the profession) was essentially one of 
continuity, thereby producing ‘. . .a telescoped view of their later development’.10 
 
Prest subsequently critiqued the functionalist assumptions of much historical and 
sociological writing on the professions – notably, that the history of the profession 
did not really begin until the Industrial Revolution. Pointing to the paucity of 
historical research on the professions in medieval and early modern England, Prest 
argued that the Bar assumed many of the characteristics of a profession, and was so 
regarded, prior to industrialization.11 Brooks’s research would subsequently 
demonstrate that, in the case of the lower branch of the profession, Prest was right.12 
 
Several of the hallmarks associated with Brooks’s scholarship gelled early in his 
career (although this is perhaps more apparent with the benefit of hindsight, rather 
than indicative of Brooks’s self-consciousness at the time). Certainly, his impressive 
first-year graduate paper, ‘The Common Lawyers in the House of Commons of 
1621’,13 presages it: [35] 
 
This essay . . . will study the role of lawyers in one House of Commons – 
that of 1621 – asking . . . were the lawyers leaders in the House, and for 
which side did they speak? Secondly, how and when did the lawyers use 
the law? That is, did they uphold it dispassionately or did they conscientiously 
distort its meaning to suit their own and the Commons’ ends? 
The inquiry will begin with a statistical analysis of the lawyers’ leadership, 
and a presentation of various educational and social facts which might 
account for their behavior. The last part of the paper will consist of a close 
evaluation of the most important events in the Parliament and the lawyers’ 
place in them. 
 




opposition and court parties, but that whether they spoke for or against 
the Crown seems to make little difference in their very strict constructionalist 
use of the law.14 
 
Brooks’s analysis of the quantitative and qualitative evidence challenged 
the historical orthodoxy. Confidently, but carefully, he disputed the 
claims of Christopher Hill, Eric Ives and Lawrence Stone.15 According 
to Brooks, the lawyers in the House were not an undifferentiated bloc, 
either defenders of the common law against Stuart absolutism or self-interested 
opportunists bent on royal preferment and therefore hostile to 
reform (especially that which might affect their purses). Rather: 
 
As the statistics demonstrate . . . the [legal] profession divid[ed] between 
support for the Crown and for the ‘country’ or ‘popular’ party. However, 
both the opposition and Court factions were characterized by their self-conscious 
role of professional upholders of the law of the land.16 
. . .The lawyers opinions were [distinguished] by legal baggage such as precedents, 
which had a significant effect on the way they saw and handled 
a problem.17 
 
Brooks concluded that ‘[t]he lawyers were leaders in the House of 
Commons of 1621’,18 that they wielded ‘great’ influence19 and that they [36] 
‘contributed greatly to the general development of the Commons’.20 
Brooks’s emphasis on the importance of lawyers and the inner world of 
the law, including how it mediated the agency of lawyers and helped to 
explain their power and influence, was unusual for the times. Equally 
striking are the means with which he addressed these issues. This paper 
heralded what would become Brooks’s abiding interests: the role of law 
and legal ideas in the seventeenth century – the political ideas expressed 
by lawyers, and the political significance of law, legal ideas and lawyers.21 
It shows how Brooks made significant strides in forging his own vision of 
law in history prior to his move to England. 
 
With Prest’s encouragement, Brooks transferred to Oxford, where 
his doctoral supervisor was J. P. Cooper, who became another important 
formative influence, shaping Brooks’s conception of the vocation 
of the historian, with its careful attention to archival sources, its 
emphasis on precision and presenting the right evidence, its erudition 
and its breadth of interests.22 As Brooks recalled: ‘Since I was interested 
in the political ideas expressed by lawyers, an examination of lawyers 
and what lawyers did seemed a logical place to start. What began as 
a digression became an ongoing preoccupation.’23 His newfound love of 
archival research was facilitated by a junior research fellowship at 




English history, and he began to develop friendships with several 
leading historians of English law, including John Baker, and to acquire 
a detailed knowledge of the law, its institutions and the sources for 
researching them. 
 
Fortunately for Brooks, English legal history was at a turning point, in 
terms of both the numbers of people involved and the range of subjects 
and approaches adopted. Brooks was in at its beginning, testing and 
refining his work through participation in the first conferences of what 
would become the bi-annual British Legal History Conference (BLHC), 
the stimulation and advice that he received, and the contacts he 
developed.24 C. A. F. Meekings guided Brooks on how best to locate [37] 
the King’s Bench files.25 Another BLHC attendee, J. S. Cockburn, then 
undertaking pioneering work applying quantitative and qualitative 
methods to the history of crime, shared his experience of the possibilities 
and pitfalls of counting cases.26 It was at the inaugural conference that 
John Baker issued a clarion call to join him in the enterprise of illuminating 
‘the dark age of English legal history’ (the legal history of Tudor and 
Stuart England), one of the most important periods in the history of the 
common law.27 And it was three years later, at the BLHC of 1975, that 
Brooks presented a paper that would mark an important milestone both 
in his career and for the history of early modern England.28 Based on the 
research conducted for his Oxford PhD thesis, Brooks’s statistical and 
descriptive analysis outlined several of the key insights with which he is 
most associated. Litigation in the courts of King’s Bench and Common 
Pleas began to soar from 1560. By 1640, there was three times more 
litigation than in 1580 – perhaps fifteen times more than there had been 
in the 1490s.29 If the increase in population is allowed for, the data 
‘implies that there was more litigation per head of population under 
Elizabeth I and the early Stuarts then there was in the early nineteenth 
century . . . Thus, it is very likely that the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries were the most litigious periods in English 
history.’30 Brooks claimed that the early modern common law courts 
were not the sole preserve of the landed classes; rather, they were surprisingly 
cheap and accessible. That there were more lawyers than ever 
before, ‘made the law a weapon which could be put into the hands of 
ordinary men’.31 
 
These findings challenged those historians – notably, Christopher 
Hill – and some contemporary puritan and other seventeenth-century 
literature critical of the common law, which saw English law as an [38] 
oppressive tool of the ruling elite.32 But there was a degree of commonality 




and including Pettyfoggers and Vipers) tended, like other historians, to 
regard legal history as excessively concerned with the internal development 
of law. Under this optic, the history of law and legal institutions was 
separate from, but connected to, social history. Brooks sought to transcend 
what he termed legal history’s preoccupation with ‘tracing the 
genealogies of doctrine’;33 rather, he gave law and its institutions 
a social context, and explored law’s place within the socio-political 
firmament. 
 
Brooks’s concern to address the social context of law paralleled contemporary 
American scholarship and the contextual turns in English 
legal education and legal history that gained fresh impetus from about the 
mid-1960s.34 Law, legal history and history were all turning outward. 
The boundaries separating ‘social’ and ‘legal’ history, and the ‘social’ and 
the ‘legal’, were blurring, although the long-standing tendency to treat 
them as distinct, and the abiding competition between them, remained. 
Occasional references to the new contextualist literature on lawyers and 
legal services in England appear in Brooks’s work.35 In a limited sense, 
then, Brooks was probably influenced by the changing nature of legal historical 
scholarship in law faculties. 
 
Brooks’s first book, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth, both 
developed his 1975 lecture and reached out into new areas. It examined [39]  
the social history of the lower branch of the legal profession – attorneys, 
solicitors and minor legal officials – who were much larger in number 
and spread more widely around the country than their more prestigious 
counterparts. Reconstructing their lives was a formidable undertaking. 
It is hard now to recapture the experimental nature of this research, for 
which there was then no training and scant expertise. Its vision of law in 
history brought together the social history of lawyers, the interplay 
between civil litigation and society, the social context of civil litigation 
and the history of ideas. Most notably, perhaps, it addressed a key issue 
that social historians had only begun to consider and which would 
continue to be at the heart of Brooks’s subsequent work – namely, the 
ways in which the law and its institutions affected and were used by 
ordinary people. It was argued that the vast majority (up to 70–80 
per cent) of plaintiffs and defendants in the common law courts were 
neither very rich nor very poor and that early modern England ‘was 
deeply imbued with the importance of the idea of the rule of law’.36 
Pettyfoggers exhibited the scholarship, professionalism and high standards 
for which Brooks’s work became a byword. As Geoffrey Elton 
observed, ‘Dr Brooks . . . has done so much . . . patiently wearisome 




for the way in which he avoided inflicting the tedium of research upon 
the reader.’37 
 
In sum, through his work on his Oxford doctoral dissertation and its 
progression to a book, Brooks had already found his way into law and 
legal history. The vision of law in history that he forged was constituted 
against: 
 
• the pure intellectual history of Pocock, and the presentation of the 
common law mind in oversimplified terms and in isolation from other 
modes of political discourse;38 
• Hill’s depiction of the common law and its practitioners as mere tools 
of the ruling elite that had nothing to offer to the bottom 80 per cent of [40] 
the population, and of legal institutions as frequently corrupt and 
subject to lax standards;39 
• the reductionist interpretation of the law as class rule, of the rule of law 
as purely fictional, of the social structure of early modern England as 
exclusively based on deference and hierarchy, and of a two-class 
(patrician/plebeian) model;40 
• the dominant tradition within social theory, the sociology of professions 
and modern history that assumed that the professions were 
a modern phenomenon and that professionalization, and the growth 
and importance of the professions, was associated with the Industrial 
Revolution, and with the needs of the aristocracy and gentry, or 
capitalism or professional self-interest;41 and 
• a legal history that treats law as a biologically closed system, detaching 
law and legal institutions from their wider context, and overrepresenting 
the experiences of the wealthier sections of society. 
 
In important respects, Brook’s vision of law in history was framed by the 
new thinking about social history that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.42 He shared 
assumptions implicit and sometimes explicit in much social history – that ‘the 
answers to the big questions could be found only in empirical historical research, 
much of it closely focused’43 – and that archival mastery and more rigorous 
processes of verification were essential, as well as that quantification, allied to 
systematic research across multiple archival sources, was necessary for 
reconstructing the past. 
 
This approach also entailed a concentration on the lived experience of the people, 
rather than the ruling elite; a preoccupation with agency over structure; an 
engagement with a much wider range of subjects, [41] many of which traversed 





And yet Brooks’s vision of law in history deviated from the mainstream of social 
history. Its originality resulted partly from the ways in which he deployed legal 
history, social history, and law and society scholarship to pursue his distinctive 
agenda and to challenge conventional wisdom. Underlying his vision was the belief 
that not only the poor and inarticulate needed rescuing from the enormous 
condescension of posterity; lawyers – particularly those practitioners of the lower 
branch who were, in comparison with the likes of Coke, ‘very largely uncelebrated 
and unknown’, and those middling groups in society to which professions such as 
the lower branch belong – also warranted rescuing.44 This was underpinned by the 
notion that lawyers, and the middling sort, were pivotal in early modern society and 
in ways that had not been fully appreciated. According to Brooks, ‘even rather 
obscure lawyers such as country attorneys made important contributions to local 
administration, politics and society’.45 
 
Studies of civil litigation, and of the criminal justice system, were usually limited by 
county, region or a specific field of litigation.46 Pettyfoggers and Vipers quantified 
civil litigation on a scale that was unprecedented.47 A part of its audacity lay in its 
claim to be a national study and in the considerable ingenuity with which it sought 
to rebuff potential concerns that the construction of judicial statistics distorted, 
concealed or omitted relevant detail to the analysis, as well as the serious 
problems of definition and methodology arising from sampling. Moreover, its 
counterintuitive findings challenged conventional conceptions of early modern 
England and modernity. 
 
Of course, those findings built upon the work of other scholars.48 In addition to the 
authors and sources already mentioned, Brooks [42] acknowledged, for example, the 
work of law and society scholars on the measurement of court usage, and its 
potential for enlarging our understanding of law in society and, in particular, his 
reliance on legal historians.49 Pettyfoggers and Vipers is also telling for what is 
omitted: nothing is said about criminal proceedings, which, while they clearly do 
not belong within the category it defined as litigation, nevertheless affected the 
amount of business handled by the courts. The new social history, including the 
history of crime and criminal law, had a brief, but critical, mention possibly 
reflecting the distance Brooks then perceived between this work and his own.50 
 
Given the amount of time already devoted to the research that culminated 
in Pettyfoggers, it was probably unrealistic to expect the book to include anything 
more than a brief discussion of the relationship between civil and criminal 
proceedings or, perhaps, the relevance of the new history of crime. But this neglect 
of the criminal justice system and the new history of crime had consequences. The 
new history of crime raised important questions about the relationship between law, 
power, domination, exclusion, structure, totality and society, and the way in which 




and position, problematizing the nature and extent of popular belief in the rule of 
law – issues that Brooks tended to de-emphasize.51 
 
[43] While some historians overlooked or minimized the agency of middling 
and ordinary people, and the use they made of the law, social historians were 
increasingly challenging the reductionist interpretation of the law as class rule and, 
in several respects, adopting a similar view of the justice system and the juridical as 
that advanced by Brooks.52 
 
From Law and Litigation in Context to Law and 
the Constitution of Society, 1987–2014 
 
Brooks subsequently reconfigured his vision of law in history by deepening 
his treatment of a number of topics addressed previously, extending the range of 
subjects that he tackled, the sources that underpinned them and the period that he 
traversed.53 He was encouraged to persist with his [44] own research by the small, 
but growing, number of historians who were researching early modern litigation, 
and the relationship between law and agency (some inspired by him), and whose 
studies confirmed the importance of going to court for ordinary men and women, a 
considerable renaissance in legal history, and signs of improved communication 
between social and legal history.54 Contemporary developments in social history 
and the study of law in society, Brooks’s deepening association with the legal history 
community and his collaboration with legal historian Michael Lobban also proved 
important. 
 
Brooks’s second book, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450, is a collection 
of larger and smaller-scale work, juxtaposed with historiographical and 
programmatic reflections. For example, Brooks extended his survey of rates of 
litigation and their likely impact on the social and political history of the country to 
cover seven-and-a-half centuries.55 This prodigious research was sustained by legal, 
socio-legal, law and society, and legal history scholarship, social, political and 
economic history, and a smattering of social theory. Brooks considered both 
immediate causal factors and the longue durée, conjecturing that the legal [45] 
culture of early modern England was more inclusive and vibrant, and that 
the institutional participation of laypersons in the legal system, access to 
the law, and political and social participation in civil society through the 
law, locally and nationally, were much greater than has been seen since. 
He concluded that ordinary people subsequently became more isolated 
from the legal system, and that ‘legal culture was arguably less significant 
in eighteenth- and-nineteenth-century England than it had been before 
1700’.56 Under this optic, the divide between early modern and modern 
England was great indeed – but not necessarily in the ways that modern 





The key to understanding Brooks’s scholarly agenda and the development 
of his vision of law in history is a manifesto lying at the heart of 
Lawyers. This twenty-page call-to-arms argued that the promise of 
‘socio-legal history’ was largely unfulfilled, that much remained to be 
done to turn that promise into a reality, and that conventional treatments 
of some of the core concerns of early modern England were, and would 
continue to be, flawed until law, legal institutions and legal history are 
taken more seriously and actively integrated within social history. Brooks 
proposed a number of measures, which amounted to a long-term plan of 
collective action that, if implemented, could significantly enrich our 
historical understanding of England, 1500–1800. 
 
Specifically, Brooks claimed that whilst much had been achieved in the 
history of crime and criminal law, and the history of those who serviced 
legal institutions: 
 
. . . there are also grounds for concern about the apparent failure of these 
branches . . . either to communicate much with each other or to make 
a significant impact on the general social and political history of England 
between 1500 and 1800. The root of the problem is that we still lack an 
analytical perspective capable of doing justice to the complex and multifaceted 
role of law in society.57 
 
[46] Brooks now focused on law as discourses that inscribed social, political 
and economic relationships, and which constituted a formal set of 
values.58 This opened the door to a consideration of lawyers as ‘a diverse 
group of people who are at the centre of the creation and exchange of one 
of the major social discourses of the day: the set of norms, practices and 
ideologies known collectively as “the law”’.59 This was a perspective that 
was increasingly adopted within the sociology of law, law and society, and 
critical legal scholarship, legal anthropology and the study of lawyers in 
society.60 Brooks noted that while this proposition may seem novel when 
applied to lawyers, it had long been a commonplace in the study of 
theology and the clerical profession. The implication was clear: what 
was good for religion was also good for law. Concerning the diverse 
influences driving legal discourse, Brooks sought to transcend those 
approaches that treated legal discourse as exclusively or largely the 
product of top-down (elite, the state) or professional influences; rather, 
he emphasized the need to investigate the biggest customers of the law – 
that is, the middling 70 per cent of the population – and the role of 
lawyers and legal discourse in facilitating and legitimating their concerns, 
as well as the extent to which the middling sort were a dynamic force 





Brooks conceded that the sources for investigating the new possibilities 
opened up by a legal discourse perspective were mainly those produced 
by lawyers. This largely unexamined lawyerly material (such as 
readings and law lectures at the Inns of Court) was uncongenial, being 
mostly in manuscript, ‘written in barbarous law French and sometimes 





This list of material could be expanded to include printed law texts, 
speeches in parliament or at state trials, unpublished treatises, and the 
addresses which were regularly used to preface charges delivered to 
quarter sessions and assizes – public utterances which often dilated on [47] 
the role of law in society. Sources such as these enable us to broaden the 
scope of legal ideology beyond the rather narrow and precedent ridden 
‘common law mind’ formulated by Professor Pocock.63 They illustrate the 
ways in which it was exchanged with the wider public. They offer the 
prospect of a history of generalised legal ideas about the state and society 
which can be traced over time and compared with that of other strands of 
thought.64 
 
Brooks encouraged social historians to study systematically the case 
law of civil courts to establish what they might tell us about ‘whole 
categories of social relationships: economic transactions; husband and- 
wife; landlord and tenant; judge and defendant; urban oligarch 
and freeman; community and person . . . [Legal] discourse always 
includes assumptions about the nature of the person, social relations 
and knowledge.’65 Brooks outlined how the development of juristic 
ideas and substantive law can offer new perspectives, while also contributing 
to areas already addressed in the study of early modern 
social history, such as the relationship between law and the community, 
and between class power, discretion and deference.66 And he 
briefly highlighted the importance of juristic thought – notably, the 
rule of law – for ideas about the state, obedience to authority and its 
promised protection against the oppression of the individual.67 
To this, he added that the relationship between law and religion had 
not received a systematic treatment on anything like the scale it 
deserved.68 Elsewhere, Brooks threw down the gauntlet on the relative 
significance of criminal and civil law: ‘[T]he civil law is even more 
important than the criminal law in maintaining the social and economic 





Again, Brooks noted that the abiding problem was ‘[o]ur continuing 
ignorance of the details of legal thought, and of its interaction with the [48] 
population at large’.70 In his final book, Law, Politics and Society, Brooks 
set out to dispel this ignorance, to test his belief in the centrality of the law 
and generally, to put his manifesto into practice. He undertook a largescale 
investigation of the nature and extent of law-consciousness, and of 
the inscription of law in politics and society, within England, Scotland, 
Wales and Ireland, from the later Middle Ages until the outbreak of the 
English civil war.71 Drawing on a host of sources, including those championed 
in his manifesto, Brooks concluded that law permeated almost all 
levels of society and that, like religion, it was a principal discourse 
through which the English understood their world. Indeed, he aimed to 
‘reintegrate the history of law, legal institutions and the legal professions 
within the general political and social history of the period’.72 Brooks also 
set out to persuade early modern historians that they should take the 
social history of law itself more seriously and to show how they might do 
so. Brooks delineated the constitutive and penetrative character of law 
throughout society by mapping the creation, transmission and reception 
of legal thought. He lavished particular attention on the thousands of 
local courts whose trials involved the presentation of oral testimony in 
a public forum. Brooks found that these local courts impacted on legal 
thinking in the central courts sustained by a legal world with ‘an enduring 
tendency to privilege customary practices’.73 He investigated both elite 
and popular law-consciousness on an almost unparalleled scale, adopting 
top-down and bottom-up approaches that revealed the trickle-up, as well 
as trickle-down, diffusion of legal ideas. 
 
This daunting project gained traction in light of the cultural turn in 
history and cognate developments in the treatment of law in society. 
While historians and lawyers have long anchored English exceptionalism 
in the rule of law and legal institutions, they have tended to treat ‘law’ and 
‘society’ as separate spheres, each independent of the other, although 
related through various mechanisms of causal linkage.74 For historians, 
‘economy’ or ‘society’ are the primary realms of experience, and the ‘law’ 
and its institutions are secondary phenomena that merely channel or [49]  
facilitate social relations. ‘Law’ served as evidence for social and economic 
history;75 it was merely a means by which ‘economy’ and ‘society’ 
might be illuminated.76 
 
But change was under way. While traditional Marxist and other leftist 
work had largely focused on the coercive and hypocritical character of 
the law, new strands within criminology, legal anthropology, social 




legal studies and American critical legal studies (CLS) progressively 
investigated and elevated law’s non-coercive legitimating functions.77 
This turn to ‘law as ideology’ led to legal ideas being taken more 
seriously, paralleling earlier and concurrent developments in the history 
of ideas, and the ‘cultural turn’.78 Importantly, this intellectual and 
political movement – a movement that was both interdisciplinary and 
transnational – challenged the separation of ‘law’ and ‘society’ and the 
one-directional causality that frequently accompanied such notions. 
According to this new paradigm, law not only classified, simplified 
and specified, but also played a significant role in constituting social 
relations, identity formation,79 and the minds and practices of 
individuals.80 
 
The social historian who best articulated this new understanding of 
law-in-society was E. P. Thompson, who concluded that law was: 
 
. . . deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive relations, which 
would have been inoperable without this law . . . The rules and categories 
of law penetrate every level of society, effect . . . and contribute to . . . [an 
individual’s] sense of identity. Productive relations themselves are, in part, [50] 
only meaningful in terms of their definitions at law: the serf, the free 
labourer; the cottager with common rights, the inhabitant without . . .81 
 
Thompson emphasized that the law could sometimes be appropriated and used by 
the politically and economically dispossessed; that socioeconomic relations in early 
modern England were not simply the product of the decisions of the elite, but 
involved an ongoing process of negotiation in which a broad cross-section of the 
population participated; and, controversially, that the rule of law was an unqualified 
human good.82 In the hands of Robert W. Gordon, a leading American historian of 
legal ideas and advocate of CLS, Thompson’s notion of law’s imbrication in society 
was allied to the idea of law as constitutive of consciousness: ‘[In] practice, it is just 
about impossible to describe any set of “basic” social practices without describing 
the legal relations among the people involved – legal relations that don’t simply 
condition how the people relate to each other but to an important extent define the 
constitutive terms of the relationship.’83 While many social historians were 
influenced by Thompson’s revisionism, his impact on Brooks was distinctive.84 In 
the first place, Brooks was the only social historian of England of whom I am aware 
whose internalization of Thompson was mediated and intensified by allied work in 
legal and cultural anthropology and CLS – notably, Gordon’s critique of 
evolutionary teleologies and the law/society divide, as well as his claim that law was 
constitutive of consciousness.85 In the second, while most of the historical work 
triggered by Thompson’s new thinking was concerned with crime and [51] criminal 
justice, Brooks’s explored the wide-ranging impact of legal discourse and the civil 





Brooks challenged that vein of social history which juxtaposed law (being the law of 
the elite and of the state) against the community (the easier-going neighbourly 
relations typical of customary village life): 
 
[There] is much that is convincing in this formulation, but it . . . does not 
confront the question of when, if ever, lawyers and the law were not so 
intimately involved in village life that social relations might be discussed 
without reference to them . . . Even a casual glance at the [manorial court] 
records . . . reveals village life to have been anything but ideally peaceful 
and devoid of contention . . . The significance of the manorial courts is 
that they throw into bold relief, indeed problematize . . . the relationship 
between custom and the generalised values of local communities versus 
the formal legal ideas on processes, such as those which were enshrined in 
Parliamentary statutes or enforced by the courts (a classic example of our 
obsession with the distinction between elite and popular culture).87 
 
The point was not that knowing something about manorial courts would 
solve the problem of defining popular justice, but that it would be 
misleading to talk about local communities, custom and justice without 
considering the ways in which they were constituted by the law.88 
 
[52] Similarly, the social and political pluralism that social historians had 
discerned in early modern society and, to some extent, counterposed 
against the law were, in important respects, connected to and sustained 
by legal pluralism.89 
 
In sum, Brooks’s intellectual development reveals a scholarly metamorphosis 
from the late 1990s onwards. From an ‘externalist’ (social and 
intellectual history) perspective on law, consciously complementing 
‘internalist’ legal history’s preoccupation with institutional and doctrinal 
evolution, he moved to embrace an approach that married ‘externalist’ 
and ‘internalist’ perspectives on law – integrating social and political 
history with the history of law, legal institutions and the legal professions. 
Always careful and rigorous, Brooks acknowledged the pitfalls 
involved in deciphering court usage and law-mindedness. While conveying 
a strong sense of the complexity of the phenomena he investigated, 
the sweep and ambition of his scholarship raises challenging evidential 
and conceptual questions. Was litigation always a good thing, both as an 
ideal and in practice?90 Was litigation equally good for all social groups in 
a society that was grossly unequal?91 And how did the significant increase 
in litigation that extended from the 1580s until the 1670s (with occasional 
minor fluctuations) impact on personal relations and contemporary 





Brooks’s partiality for things ‘legal’ extended to lawyers, whom he usually held in 
high regard. He was especially smitten with Coke.93 He rebutted, perhaps 
overenthusiastically, contemporary criticisms of attorneys (namely, that they cheated 
and exploited their clients, and that they were poorly regulated), the inequities of the 
legal system, the adequacy of [53] the Inns of Court’s provision for professional 
regulation and education, and persistent demands for law reform.94 
 
Brooks’s claims that adherence to, and respect for, the rule of law was widespread, 
and that the law and law-consciousness penetrated, and in vital respects, constituted 
much of early modern England, run into the problem that apparent use and 
conformity with the law, or knowing the law, may obscure non-conformity and a 
lack of legitimacy.95 That people justified their action by reference to the law does 
not in itself confirm the legitimacy of the rule of law. Individuals who appeal to the 
rule of law may do so differently in different contexts and times, and such appeals 
are as likely to be motivated by short-term or self-interested sentiment as by a belief 
in the legitimacy of the law.96 It is also likely that the idea of the ‘rule of law’ meant 
different things to, say, landowners and the poor, and that these differences were 
compounded by the existence of overlapping and sometimes competing systems of 
governance. Indeed, the motives and beliefs of individuals when they appeal to 
legality are almost invariably mixed. It may not be possible to differentiate those 
motives and beliefs (such as pragmatism, Christian morality, a desire to protect one’s 
family, possessions and livelihood, or acquiescence in law’s power) – especially 
given the stark social and economic inequalities and disadvantages of the age – and 
to establish their relative importance. 
 
Brooks recognized that the relationship between the legal ideas discussed in 
Parliament, or famous state trials, and the everyday legal life of the mass of the 
population was problematic; he acknowledged that ‘it is not easy to measure the 
practical impact of’ law.97 But this sits uneasily with some aspects of his analytical 
framework – notably, that law was ‘deeply imbricated’ throughout society and 
supremely ‘constitutive of consciousness’. These assumptions confirmed Brooks’s 
long-standing belief that ‘[l]aw, and the sources of authority for lawmaking, were 
central features of seventeenth-century discourse’ and an essential part of the 
mentality of most people of the age.98 When taken too literally, [54] however, these 
assumptions become trans-historical relational statements, rather than working 
hypotheses, akin to the reversal of the hitherto dominant base–superstructure 
polarities, switching one directionality and causality for another, rendering law 
wholly autonomous, and thereby exaggerating the range and depth of law-
consciousness, and law’s legitimacy, and marginalizing ‘alternative’ discourses, such 





Also, what makes ‘law-mindedness’ or a promise to perform a contract ‘legal’, as 
distinct from ‘religious’, ‘moral’, ‘economic’, ‘political’ and so on (all of which may 
be partly shaped by ‘law’)?100 Of course, law matters – but ‘everyday life has its 
own battery of normative ideas and habits, which interact with law, even when law 
is at its most constitutive’.101 
 
This suggests that, until we know how individuals such as defendants judged their 
engagement with the law, claims about law-mindedness and legitimacy are best kept 
modest and circumspect. It also points towards the need for greater discussion of the 
complex and diverse definitions of law-mindedness, law-consciousness, legitimacy, 
imbrication, ideology, negotiation and other key concepts explicitly and implicitly 
employed in such research, and the possible locations of their empirical referents.  
 
[55] The problems posed by Brooks’s larger conclusions reflect, to some extent, the 
problems of social history and the wider study of law-in-society.102 
 
The claim that legal culture was less important after c. 1700 than in the period c. 
1560–1700 is difficult to access in any general sense, at least without much more 
research, and is likely to elicit a complex response.103 To some extent, it depends 
where you look. While the decline of legal culture in the eighteenth century has been 
persuasively canvassed,104 for those engaged in modern history, the story may not 
be straightforward. Lawyers and legal thinkers such as Bentham, Fitzjames Stephen, 
Maine, Dicey and Bryce were, in varying degrees, public intellectuals who supplied 
ideological rationales for the character of English society or for social reform, staking 
claims to represent certain cultural practices and ideas, or certain groups, such as the 
middle classes. More generally, law and lawyers were active in both the construction 
of the British state and the British Empire – with lawyers playing key roles as 
administrators, the drafters of comprehensive codes of law, the authors of legal 
textbooks that reconstituted the law, and as members of Parliament, judges and 
jurists.105 The close involvement of lawyers and professional bodies such [56] as the 
Law Society in the formulation of legislation, law reform and legal practice suggests 
that they exercised an important influence on the available normative languages, on 
the contemporary definitions of the public and the private, and therefore on the 
presuppositions of the legislative and decision-making process.106 Moreover, the 
law was far from absent in contemporary fiction.107 
 
None of this, however, challenges the importance of Brooks’s scholarship. Brooks’s 
achievement was to systematically integrate law, politics and society, and legal, 
social and political history, and to demonstrate the considerable increase in historical 
knowledge that is likely to ensue from this fusion. He took law out of the law courts 
and lawyers’ offices and brought it into society. Brooks, probably more than any 




significance of legal history, legal doctrine and legal culture – the law from the 
‘outside’ and the ‘inside’.108 This substantiated their importance, providing valuable 
guidance on how they might be understood and on the sources for researching them. 
He demonstrated that law and lawyers warranted at least the same attention as that 
traditionally lavished on religion and clerics.109 While his larger conclusions may be 
contested, it is hard to see how his emphasis on the centrality of law to so many 
aspects of early modern England will ever be overturned. Brooks was clear that his 
was the first, not the last, word on the subject.110 Like most original, cutting-edge 
scholarship, his raises as many questions as it answers, but in so doing it highlights 
important [57] themes and issues for future scholarship to consider. More generally, 
Brooks’s manifesto and his stress on the need for an analytical framework capable of 
doing justice to the complex and multifaceted role of law in society remain both 
important visionary prescriptions and challenges for historians. This is especially so 
in this age of constant pressure for quick returns on university budgets, and the 
increasingly limited ability of universities in general and the humanities in particular 
to undertake long-term research and to foster sustained interdisciplinary 
collaboration of the kind advanced by Brooks.111 Likewise, the lack of institutional 
commitment to bringing together history and law in the United Kingdom relative to, 
say, Canada and the United States, may inhibit his impact. Is there, for example, 
sufficient support to enable and encourage historians to acquire the requisite skills 
necessary for working on lawyer’s materials? It would be regrettable if Brooks’s 
reach were to fail to extend beyond social history and law and literature into the 
realms of general history, the history of politics and socio-legal studies. 
 
By describing and analysing in such exceptional detail what he conceived 
as the golden age of English law and society, and by arguing against any kind of 
linear or progressive evolution over time, Brooks reminds us why the questions that 
were at the forefront of his attention – lay participation in law and governance, 
access to justice, the recognition of the public interest and moral imperatives, as well 
as private interest, within legal discourse and legislative authority, and the rule of 
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